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Halprin and Wah: Ethics in International Arbitration

Ethics in International Arbitration
Peter Halprin* & Stephen Wah**
The growth of international arbitration has expanded both the pool of arbitrators as well as the counsel involved in international arbitration. This growth has
resulted in arbitrators, counsel, and parties of various cultural and legal traditions
participating in disputes. Because different cultural and legal traditions may come
into conflict, there is increasing focus and discussion regarding what guidelines or
rules, if any, should govern international arbitrations. The discussion regarding
whether any guidelines or rules should govern arbitration asks whether a forum for
dispute resolution built on the concepts of neutrality, party autonomy, and procedural flexibility should be governed by strict rules imposed by an authority other
than the parties.
In 2010, Doak Bishop gave the keynote address at the ICCA Congress in Rio
De Janeiro on the topic of ethics in international arbitration advocacy.1 He took the
position that there is a current, compelling need for the development of a Code of
Ethics in international arbitration and for the adaptation of tribunals and institutions
to the adoption of such a code.2 Although he set forth a number of examples of the
current challenges, one such example, attributed to Johnny Veeder, illustrates the
dilemma: “What are the professional rules applicable to an Indian lawyer in a Hong
Kong arbitration between a Bahraini claimant and a Japanese defendant represented
by New York lawyers…”3 In proposing a Code of Ethics, Mr. Bishop submitted
that such a Code could accomplish three goals: (1) clarifying the applicable rules
and reducing ambiguity; (2) leveling the playing field so that conflicting obligations
do not unduly benefit one party at the expense of the other; and (3) providing greater
transparency, and building confidence in the system.4 Such a Code would thus,
theoretically, solve the challenge outlined by Mr. Veeder.
On the other hand, respected practitioners have pointed out the difficulties with
such a code. As set forth by the two authors, “[g]iven the local or regional differences in the formulation and application of ethics rules, it is unclear how divergences may simply be ‘papered over’, resolved or erased with the imposition of a
single, universal, uniform code.” 5 While the debate continues, the ethical quandaries remain. In addressing such issues, the vantage points as well as the applicable
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1. See Doak Bishop, Ethics in International Arbitration INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION,
1
(2010),
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12763302233510/icca_rio_keynote_speech.pdf.
2. See id.
3. See id. at 4.
4. See id. at 10–11.
5. See Toby Landau QC and J. Romesh Weeramantry, A Pause for Thought, in 17 INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: THE COMING OF A NEW AGE 496, 501 (Albert Janven den Berg ed., 2013). Landau has
been further quoted expressing the concern that regulation might “cure the disease but kill the patient.”
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rules and guidelines governing arbitrator and counsel conduct differ. As such, this
Article addresses ethics in international arbitration first from the vantage point of
arbitrators and then from the vantage point of counsel.

I. INTERNATIONAL ETHICS RULES FOR ARBITRATORS
As international arbitration has increased in popularity, there has been an expansion in the pool of arbitrators, and a commensurate diversification of the cultural
and legal traditions among them and among parties.6 In response, there has been
increased attention on the standards used to evaluate arbitrator conduct, including a
proliferation of specialized codes of ethics and rules intended to guide and govern
arbitrator conduct.7
In the absence of a mandatory international code governing the conduct of arbitrators in international arbitration, a number of international guidelines have been
developed. As discussed in detail below, although such guidelines are not binding,
they present useful guideposts in determining what conduct is ethical in international arbitration. In particular, guidelines promulgated by the International Bar
Association (“IBA”) are considered most reflective of international practice.8
In an abundance of caution, potential arbitrators, as well as those appointed to
serve, would be wise to review international guidelines, the applicable rules of the
institution (if any) administering the dispute, and those of any bar association(s) of
the jurisdiction(s) potentially applicable to the dispute (including those of the jurisdiction where the arbitrator is admitted to practice).
In familiarizing themselves with national law, arbitrators should take the time
to review pertinent case law pertaining to the concepts of impartiality and independence. Generally, under national laws and arbitral rules, an arbitrator has to be and
remain independent and impartial, and must disclose all facts that may be relevant
to their independence and impartiality.9 The exact meaning of the terms “independent” and “impartial” may be unclear and may differ under different arbitral rules
and legal regimes.10 In general, however, independence refers to the requirement
that there be “no actual or past dependent relationship between the parties and the
arbitrators which may or at least appear to affect the arbitrator’s freedom of judgment.”11 Impartiality, generally, refers to the requirement that arbitrators neither

See CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 224 (Oxford University Press,
2014).
6. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 1-2; see also Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of International Arbitrators, Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2007-01, LEADING ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, JURIS PUBLISHING, 2008, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081436.
7. See id.
8. See infra Part I, A and B.
9. See JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 255 (2003); see also English Arbitration Act of 1996
(24)(1); 9 U.S.C.A. § 10( a)(2); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2013), Art. 12(1); London
Court of International Arbitration Rules (2014), Art. 5.3; ICC Rules of Arbitration (2012), Art. 11(1).
10. See LEW, supra note 9, at 257; see also Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co.,
393 U.S. 145 (1968); compare AT&T Corporation & Lucent Technologies Inc. v. Saudi Cable Company,
[2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 (Court of Appeal).
11. See LEW, supra note 9, at 261.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2018/iss1/10

2

Halprin and Wah: Ethics in International Arbitration

No. 1]

Ethics in International Arbitration

89

favor one party nor are predisposed with regard to the disputed issue(s).12 According to Julian Lew, “[w]hile impartiality is needed to ensure that justice is done,
independence is needed to ensure that justice is seen to be done.”13 An arbitrator’s
lack of impartiality or independence can provide grounds for the challenge of an
arbitrator or to an award.14

A. IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators
In the late 1980s, the IBA set forth ethical rules to govern the conduct of international arbitrators (the “Rules of Ethics”).15 As explained in the Introductory Note:
International arbitrators should be impartial, independent, competent, diligent and discreet. The rules seek to establish the manner in which these
abstract qualities may be assessed in practice. Rather than rigid rules, the
Rule of Ethics reflects internationally acceptable guidelines developed by
practising lawyers from all continents.16
The IBA sought to emphasize the fact that the rules cannot be binding upon
either the arbitrators or the parties in the absence of an adoption by agreement.17
The IBA emphasized that the Rules of Ethics were not intended to create grounds
for the setting aside of awards by national courts.18 The Rules of Ethics cover a
number of areas of ethics including the elements of bias, the duty of disclosure,
communications with parties, and the confidentiality of the deliberations. The
“Fundamental Rule” is that “[a]rbitrators shall proceed diligently and efficiently to
provide the parties with a just and effective resolution of their disputes, and shall be
and remain free from bias.”19
An arbitrator, under the Rules of Ethics, shall accept an appointment only if:
(1) he is fully satisfied that he is able to discharge his duties without bias;
(2) he is fully satisfied that he is competent to determine the issues in dispute,
and has an adequate knowledge of the language of the arbitration; and
(3) he is able to give to the arbitration the time and attention which the parties
are reasonably entitled to expect.20
Bias is determined with respect to both impartiality and independence.21 The
former relates to favoritism toward one of the parties, while the latter arises from
12. See id. at 258; compare Klaus Lionnet, The Arbitrator’s Contract, 15 ARB. INT’L 161, 167 (1999)
(“Almost always, the parties nominate arbitrators, because this is the parties’ fundamental procedural
right. This was recently confirmed by a decision of the German Supreme Court”).
13. See LEW, supra note 9, at 261.
14. See AT&T Corporation & Lucent Technologies Inc., [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep at 127 (“requiring real
danger of bias”); see also Lawrence Shore, Disclosure and Impartiality: An Arbitrator’s Responsibility
vis-à-vis Legal Standards, DISP. RESOL. J. 32, 38 (2002) (highlighting differences between Circuits of
the United States Courts of Appeal with respect to the standard for demonstrating bias).
15. INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA RULES OF ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS, 15 INT’L BUS.
LAWYER
335,
335
(1987),
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ibl15&div=91&id=&page=.
16. Id. at 336.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at § 1.
20. Id. at 336–37, §§ 2.1-2.3.
21. INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 15, at 337, § 3.1.
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relationships between an arbitrator and one of the parties.22 Because, according to
the Rules of Ethics, the appearance of bias is best overcome by full disclosure, a
prospective arbitrator “should disclose all facts or circumstances which give rise to
justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence.”23
Communications with the parties are permitted prior to appointment, largely
for the purpose of avoiding conflicts and ensuring that a potential arbitrator has the
requisite time to devote to the dispute, as well as during the selection of a third or
presiding arbitrator where there are three arbitrators.24 Ex parte communications
with the parties, however, are discouraged.25 Where the parties have requested or
consented to the suggestion of settling the case, the tribunal as a whole may make
proposals for settlement to the parties.26
The Rules of Ethics also require arbitrators to observe the duty of diligence in
that, in addition to devoting the proper time and attention to the proceedings, arbitrators are required to do their best to conduct the arbitration in such a manner that
costs do not rise to an unreasonable proportion of the interests at stake.27

B. IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest
In 2004, the IBA promulgated the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration (the “Guidelines”). The Guidelines were subsequently updated in 2014.28
The Guidelines are not mandatory legal provisions and neither override applicable laws nor the rules chosen by the parties.29 They were designed with the aim
of finding “general acceptance and adherence within the international community.”30 Although the Guidelines have been criticized from various quarters, and
have not been adopted by major arbitral institutions such as the ICC International
Court of Arbitration and the London Court of International Arbitration, they have
largely achieved these results as they are commonly referenced and generally considered persuasive authority in international arbitration.31
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at § 4.1.
Id. at §§ 5.1–5.2.
See id. at § 5.3.
See id. at 338, § 8.
INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 15, at 338, § 7.
INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION,
i-iii
(2014),
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#.
29. Id. at 3, ¶ 6; See also Edna Sussman, Ethics in International Arbitration: Soft Law Guidance for
Arbitrators and Party Representatives in Soft Law in International Arbitration, in SOFT LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 239, 247 (Lawrence W. Newman & Michael J. Radine, eds., 2014).
30. Sussman, supra note 29, at 247.
31. See, e.g., W Limited v. M SDN BHD [2016] EWHC (Comm.) 422 ¶ 33(Eng.) (referencing the
“distinguished contribution” made by the Guidelines in the field of international arbitration); see also
INT’L BAR ASS’N ARBITRATION GUIDELINES AND RULES SUBCOMM., REPORT ON THE RECEPTION OF
THE IBA ARBITRATION SOFT LAW PRODUCTS, 29 (2016), (noting the broad acceptance and use by the
international arbitration community); Id. at page 39 (noting that the ICC has repeatedly stated that it is
not bound by the Guidelines). The Report further provides that, based on survey results, the Guidelines
were referenced in approximately 65% of the cases in which issues of conflicts arose at the time of the
constitution of the panel, and that when acting as arbitrators, North American practitioners consulted or
relied upon the Guidelines in approximately 84% of cases when deciding on whether to accept an appointment and 91% of the cases when making a disclosure. Id. at 40-41.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2018/iss1/10

4

Halprin and Wah: Ethics in International Arbitration

No. 1]

Ethics in International Arbitration

91

Part II of the Guidelines, “Practical Application of the General Standards,”32 is
often invoked in international arbitration because it provides a simple color-based
system involving specific factual scenarios to determine whether the appointment
of an arbitrator violates conflict of interest rules. Part II of the Guidelines is divided
into the following parts: a non-waivable Red List, a waivable Red List, an Orange
List, and a Green List.
The non-waivable Red List includes “situations deriving from the overriding
principle that no person can be his or her own judge. Therefore, acceptance of such
a conflict cannot cure the conflict.”33 Under the Guidelines, an example of a nonwaivable Red List situation is one in which the arbitrator is a legal representative or
employee of an entity that is a party in the arbitration.34
The waivable Red List consists of less severe situations but situations that are
severe enough such that they are waivable “only if and when the parties, being
aware of the conflict of interest situation, expressly state their willingness to have
such a person act as arbitrator….”35 An example of a waivable Red List situation
is one in which the arbitrator has given legal advice, or provided an expert opinion,
on the dispute to a party or an affiliate of one of the parties, or where the arbitrator
had a prior involvement in the dispute.36
The Orange List involves situations in which there may be justifiable doubts as
to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.37 Thus, pursuant to the IBA Guidelines, an arbitrator has a duty to disclose in such situations.38 It should be noted,
however, that the failure to disclose “should not result automatically in either nonappointment, later disqualification or a successful challenge to any award.”39 Indeed, “[n]ondisclosure cannot by itself make an arbitrator partial or lacking independence: only the facts or circumstances that he or she failed to disclose can do
so.”40 Orange List situations involve those in which the arbitrator has previously
provided services for one of the parties or had other involvement in the case such
as where “[t]he arbitrator has, within the past three years, served as counsel against
one of the parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties, in an unrelated matter.”41
The Green List involves situations in which there is no appearance of or actual
conflict of interest.42 Thus, the arbitrator has no duty to disclose situations falling
within the Green List.43 An example of a Green List situation is one in which the
arbitrator has previously expressed a legal opinion concerning an issue that also
arises in the arbitration but the opinion is not focused on the case.44

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 28, at 17.
Id. at ¶ 2.
Id. at 20, § 1.1.
Id.at 17, ¶ 2.
Id. at 2, § 2.1.
See id. at 18, ¶ 3.
INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 28, at 18, ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 5.
Id.
Id. at 22, § 3.1.2.
Id. at 19, 7.
Id.
INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 28, at 25, § 4.1.1.
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i. Key Changes in the 2014 Guidelines
The latest revisions to the Guidelines, the 2014 Guidelines, acknowledged “the
increased complexity in the analysis of disclosure and conflict of interest issues”
and sought to provide some guidance in contemporary practice.45 The 2014 Guidelines contain a number of key revisions including those with respect to advance
waivers, the arbitrator “bearing the identity” of their law firm, third-party funding,
and tribunal secretaries.46 For advance waivers, the General Standard 3(b) of the
2014 Guidelines provides that while the validity and effect of such waivers will
depend upon the circumstances, an arbitrator’s ongoing duty of disclosure is nondischargeable.47 With respect to “bearing the identity,” General Standard 6(a) of
the 2014 Guidelines provides that an arbitrator is considered to bear the identify of
his or her law firm.48 Thus, arbitrators at firms must evaluate conflicts in the context
of their law firms.
Similarly, with regard to third-party funding, General Standard 6(b) of the 2014
Guidelines now provides that:
Any legal or physical person having a controlling influence on the legal
entity, or a direct economic interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for,
the award to be rendered in the arbitration may be considered to bear the
identity of such a party.49
Tribunal secretaries and assistants, pursuant to General Standard 5(b), are expressly subject to the Guidelines.50
The 2014 Guidelines also make changes in the lists under Part II of the Guidelines. Arbitrators should review the revisions as new scenarios have been added.
Without delving into the whole of the changes, two revisions are highlighted here.
First, although this is really a change in the General Standards, one revision relates
to the Non-Waivable Red List under which arbitrators are now advised not to act
even in the absence of a timely objection.51 Second, the Green List now contemplates relationships through social media.52 Thus, potential arbitrators need not delete their LinkedIn profiles.

ii. Judicial Applications of the Guidelines
Although the Guidelines are rarely the subject of judicial scrutiny, there are a
number of cases in which courts have looked to the Guidelines in proceedings to

45. Id, At 1, ¶ 1.
46. See, e.g., Khaled Moyeed, Clare Montgomery, & Neal Pal, A Guide to the IBA’s Revised Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jan. 29, 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/01/29/a-guide-to-the-ibas-revised-guidelines-on-conflicts-of-interest/.
47. INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 28, at 7.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 12.
51. See id. at 18, ¶ 4.
52. See id. at 27, § 4.4.4.
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challenge awards involving allegations of arbitrator bias.53 In one such survey of
case law, the IBA Conflicts of Interest Subcommittee suggested that perhaps
“courts’ reluctance to refer to the Guidelines may be rooted in the belief that domestic law provides a comprehensive regime governing arbitrators’ independence
and impartiality.”54 Time has passed since the initial survey was published in 2007,
and a more recent IBA report noted that “the Guidelines often have been referenced
by the relevant Decision-maker (arbitral institutions, tribunals, or courts) in reaching a pronouncement on the existence of a conflict of interest.”55 Although there is
a dearth of judicial guidance on the subject, the below review of case law from a
few select jurisdictions provides a snapshot into how courts view the Guidelines.

1. Application of the Guidelines by U.S. Courts
In Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S.,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York looked to the
Guidelines in analyzing whether the umpire’s alleged failure to disclose provided a
basis for vacating an arbitral award.56 The dispute centered on alleged omissions
that the Chair made in providing his disclosures. While initially stating that he had
no conflicts of interest, the Chair failed to later disclose that his company was conducting business with a company that was pursuing the purchase of a party to the
dispute. The Court looked to the arbitration agreement (which had provisions regarding disclosure and financial interests), the American Arbitration Association’s
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, and the IBA Guidelines on
Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration. Looking to the Guidelines, the
Court noted that the Guidelines were intended to aid “parties, practitioners, arbitrators, institutions and the courts in their decision-making process on these very important questions of impartiality, independence, disclosure, objections and challenges made in that connection.”57
The Court determined that both the AAA’s Code of Ethics and the Guidelines
suggest that “any doubt as to whether or not to disclose should be resolved in favor
of disclosure.”58 While the amount of business conducted between the Chair’s company and the company considering acquiring a party to the dispute was found to
have been minimal, based on these authorities, the Chair had a duty to disclose that

53. SUSSMAN, supra note 29, at 248 (“Few court decisions have cited the guidelines and those that
have often have done so without deference to their provisions”); Judith Gill, The IBA Conflicts Guidelines – Who’s Using Them and How? 1 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 58 (2007) (survey regarding use of the
Guidelines); INT’L BAR ASS’N CONFLICTS OF INTEREST SUBCOMM., The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest in International Arbitration: The First Five Years 2004-2009, 4 DISPUTE RESOL. INT’L 5 (2010).
Although this reflects the attitudes of arbitration users, as opposed to courts, it is worth noting that 71%
of respondents indicated that they had seen the Guidelines used in practice and a further 19% were aware
of them but had not seen them used in practice. See QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, SCHOOL
OF ARBITRATION & WHITE & CASE LLP, 2015 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY:
IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 35. According to the same survey, 60% of respondents familiar with the Guidelines considered them effective. Id. at 36.
54. INT’L BAR ASS’N CONFLICTS OF INTEREST SUBCOMM., supra note 53, at 6.
55. INT’L BAR ASS’N ARBITRATION GUIDELINES AND RULES SUBCOMM., supra note 31, at 29.
56. Applied Industrial Materials Corp v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., No. 05 CV
10540(RPP), 2006 WL 1816383 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); aff’d, 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007).
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id.
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which could create the appearance of partiality.59 The Court also looked to the
Guidelines for the proposition that, “[f]ailure to disclose a potential conflict is not
excused by lack of knowledge if the arbitrator makes no reasonable attempt to investigate.”60 The Court used this provision to support the conclusion that the
Chair’s failure to investigate the relationship between his company and the potential
acquirer did not excuse his lack of disclosure.61
The Court’s reliance upon the Guidelines appeared to be grounded in the following notions:
It is important that courts enforce rules of ethics for arbitrators in order to
encourage businesses to have confidence in the integrity of the arbitration
process, secure in the knowledge that arbitrators will adhere to these standards…Because of the increase in international transactions and the corresponding increase in disputes it is crucial that there exist a requirement of
an appearance of impartiality in arbitrations conducted in this jurisdiction,
and that courts take actions designed to assure foreign entities that arbitrations in the United States are free from the suggestion of partiality.62
In New Regency Productions v. Nippon Herald Films, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit referenced the Guidelines in rendering a decision
on, among other things, an arbitrator’s duty to investigate and disclose conflicts.63
Akin to the District Court in Applied Indus. Materials Corp., in addition to referencing the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, the
Ninth Circuit referenced the Guidelines.64 Specifically, the Court referenced General Standard 7(c), which provides that an arbitrator is under a duty to investigate
potential conflicts and that the failure to disclose is not excused by a lack of
knowledge if there is no reasonable attempt to investigate.65 Regarding the Guidelines, the Ninth Circuit explained that although it was “not binding authority and
[does] not have the force of law, when considered along with an attorney’s traditional duty to avoid conflicts of interest,” the Guidelines reinforced case law authority.66
In a recent case, Republic of Argentina v. AWG Grp. Ltd., the Republic of Argentina sought to vacate an arbitration award, in part, because one of the arbitrators
allegedly had a direct interest in the outcome of the award.67 In support of its position, Argentina cited the Guidelines and argued that the arbitrator’s role as a director
of an organization fell within the Guidelines’ Non-Waivable Red List.68 Citing
New Regency, the Court found that “[o]ther courts have found these guidelines to
59. See id. at 9.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 9; Judith Gill reports that there is an unpublished decision, HSN Capital LLC (USA) v.
Productora y Comercializador SA de CV (Mexico), Case No. 8:05-CV-1769-T-30TBM, 2006 WL
1876941 (M.D. Fla. July 5, 2006), in which the court rejected the respondent’s invitation to rely on the
Guidelines in a dispute regarding bias. See Gill, supra note 53, at 68, n. 34.
63. 501 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2006).
64. See id. at 1109-10.
65. See id. at 1110.
66. Id.
67. Republic of Arg. v. AWG Grp. Ltd., 221 F. Supp. 3d 335, 346- 47 (D.D.C 2016).
68. Id. at 355.
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be persuasive, but not binding authority.”69 The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia found that the guidelines did not favor Argentina’s position as
they require a material interest and such interest was “wholly absent on the part of
the challenged arbitrator.”70

2. Application of the Guidelines by Canadian Courts
In Canada, it is reported that parties frequently consult the Guidelines in selecting party-appointed arbitrators.71 Since 2007, there have been at least two decisions
from Ontario involving the Guidelines.72
In Telesat Canada v. Boeing Satellite Systems Int’l Inc., a party challenged a
chairperson on the grounds that her partner, in a three-person law firm, was engaged
as an arbitrator in a related arbitration, with overlapping evidence and issues between the arbitrations, involving one of the parties to the dispute.73 The Court
looked to the Guidelines, holding that although they were not incorporated by reference in the arbitration, “the issue of potential apprehension of bias […] is not
particular to international arbitrations […] and sheds light directly on the issue of
this Chairperson through the lens of the arbitration community.”74 After analyzing
the General Standards 2 and 6, and the pertinent situations set forth in the lists, the
Court determined that the Chairperson firm’s involvement in the case required the
express consent of both parties, which was not received, in accepting the appointment of the Chairperson.75 Given the potential for bias, and national law on the
subject, the Court determined that the impartiality of the panel and the public’s perception of the integrity of the process would be enhanced by replacement of the
Chairperson.76
In Jacobs Securities Inc. v. Typhoon Capital B.V., the Claimant challenged an
adverse award on the grounds that the circumstances gave rise to justifiable doubts
as to the sole arbitrator’s independence and impartiality.77 Looking to the Guidelines, as urged by Claimant, the Court rejected the notion that the arbitrator was
biased because his former firm, and not his current firm, had acted for a third party
that was involved in the arbitration. In utilizing the Guidelines, the Court described
them as “widely recognised as an authoritative source of information as to how the
international arbitration community may regard particular fact situations in reasonable apprehension of bias cases.”78

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
See Gill, supra note 53, at 61.
See INT’L BAR ASS’N ARB. GUIDELINES AND RULES SUBCOMM., supra note 31, at 63.
Telesat Canada v. Boeing Satellite Sys. Int’l, Inc., 2010 ONSC 4023 (CanLII).
See id. at 154.
See id. at 155-59.
See id. at 161-62.
Jacob Sec. Inc. v. Typhoon Capital B.V., 2016 ONSC 604 (CanLII).
Id. at ¶ 41.
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3. Application of the Guidelines by U.K. Courts
According to the 2007 survey, the use of the Guidelines in the U.K. was reported to be varied.79 On the one hand, a majority of practitioners reported no mention of the Guidelines in their practice in the appointment and challenge of arbitrators.80 On the other hand, for those that reported use in their practice, they reported
that the Guidelines were considered to be a “useful compendium of the views of
international practitioners and internationally accepted practices.”81
There have been a few decisions by U.K. Courts referencing the Guidelines.82
The decisions vary in their willingness to apply and adopt the Guidelines. One
recent decision of particular note, addressed below, referenced the “contribution”
of the Guidelines while criticizing a number of provisions.
In ASM Shipping Limited of India v. TTMI Limited of England, the Commercial
Court rejected an attempt to use the Guidelines as further guidance in a dispute
regarding an allegation of apparent bias against one of the arbitrators.83 The Court
determined that the situation at bar was not covered by the Guidelines and that in
any event, the Guidelines were not germane to the dispute.84 One analysis of the
case, however, has suggested that the Court was, in fact, invited to draw inferences
from the non-inclusion of the case in the Guidelines but did not do so.85
In A and others v. B and another, the Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial
Court, was asked to decide a challenge to an LCIA award on the grounds that there
were justifiable doubts as to the impartiality of the sole arbitrator.86 In support of
the Claimant’s argument, the Claimant sought to invoke the Guidelines “not because…they are mandatorily applicable, but because their spirit shows what the international arbitration community considers does give rise or may give rise to a real
risk of bias.”87 Noting that the Guidelines may not specifically address the manner
at hand, Claimant argued that the Court should apply the approach of the Guidelines
“by analogy on the basis that their spirit covers what should happen in all cases of
potential conflict, irrespective of whether the facts of the particular case fall within
the list.”88 The Court did not accept the Claimant’s argument and held that because
the Guidelines were expressly intended not to override national rules, they could
not alter the Court’s decision.89 The Court also declined to adopt Claimant’s argument that the situation was within the “spirit” of the Guidelines.90
As noted above, the Guidelines were recently criticized in an English decision.
In W Limited v. M SDN BHD, the court considered a challenge to two arbitration
awards issued by a sole arbitrator.91 The claimant challenged the award on the basis
of the English Arbitration Act, which permits a challenge “on the grounds of serious
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Gill, supra note 53, at 67.
Id.
Id.
INT’L BAR ASS’N ARBITRATION GUIDELINES AND RULES SUBCOMM., supra note 31, at 61.
2005 APP. L.R. 10/19.
See id. at ¶ 39(4).
INT’L BAR ASS’N CONFLICTS OF INTEREST SUBCOMM., supra note 53, at 11.
2011 EWHC 2345, ¶ 1 (Comm.).
See id. at ¶ 37.
See id. at ¶ 39.
See id. at ¶ 73.
See id. at ¶ 77.
W Limited v. M SDN BHD, [2016] EWHC 422 (Eng).
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irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award.”92 In support of
the challenge, Claimant cited to the Guidelines that provide, in pertinent part, that
a non-waivable red list conflict exists where an arbitrator (or their firm) “regularly
advises the party, or an affiliate of the party” and “derives significant financial income therefrom.”93 An “affiliate” is broadly defined in the Guidelines as all companies in a group of companies.
The arbitrator was a partner at a law firm that provided services to a client
company that had the same corporate parent as Respondent. His firm, however, did
not advise the parent company or the respondent’s party, and there was no suggestion that he personally did work for the client company. Despite this, and relying
upon the Guidelines’ definition of “affiliate,” Claimant argued that since the arbitrator’s firm did work for a client company with the same parent company as Respondent, there was a conflict of interest.
After concluding that there would be no conflict under applicable English law,
the Court addressed Claimant’s position under the Guidelines. The Court took issue
with the application of the term “affiliate.”94 Specifically, the Court criticized the
notion that an arbitrator could be disqualified where they were neither aware of, nor
involved with, the advising of an affiliate of a party.95
The Court also questioned the application of Guidelines insofar as there appear
to be tensions between some of the General Standards.96 In Part 2(1), the Guidelines
state that “[i]n all cases” it is “the General Standards should control the outcome”
and General Standard (2)(d) maintains a “categoric position, not allowing for judgment by reference to the facts of the case.”97 On the other hand, General Standard
(6)(a) states that the relationship between an arbitration and a law firm “should be
considered in each individual case,” dispelling the idea that these are “catch-all
rules.”98

4. Application of the Guidelines in Swiss Courts
Although no Swiss court decisions were reported in the 2007 survey, survey
respondents reported use of the Guidelines in Switzerland at the stage of the appointment of arbitrators.99 Subsequent to the survey, as discussed below, Switzerland’s highest court commented upon the Guidelines. Since that decision, as set
forth in the recent IBA Report, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court has referenced the
Guidelines in five cases, once without prompting by the parties.100
In a decision issued by Switzerland’s highest court, a party challenged an adverse arbitration award on the grounds that the panel was improperly composed.101
The party challenging the award argued that the panel was improperly composed
because a party-appointed arbitrator, counsel, and the chair all belonged to the same
professional organization. The Court discussed the Guidelines as follows:
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See id. at ¶ 3.
See id. at ¶ 5.
See id. at ¶¶ 33–41.
See id.
See id.
W Limited v. M SDN BHD, 2016 EWHC 422 at ¶ 38 (Eng).
Id. at ¶ 39.
Gill, supra note 53, at 67.
INT’L BAR ASS’N ARB. GUIDELINES AND RULES SUBCOMM., supra note 31, at 59.
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 20, 2008, 4A_506/2007 (Switz.).
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Such guidelines admittedly have no statutory value; yet they are a precious
instrument, capable of contributing to harmonization and unification of the
standards applied in the field of international arbitration to dispose of conflict of interests and such an instrument should not fail to influence the
practice of arbitral institutions and tribunals.102
Referring the parties to the Green List, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court held
that professional relationships between the arbitrators and counsel within the framework of a professional or social association are not sufficient to justify a challenge
nor does it oblige the arbitrators to disclosure that affiliation in their statements of
independence, and thusly rejected the challenge.103
Per the IBA Report, a later decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court set
forth the following position on the Guidelines:
[O]ne should not overestimate the weight to be given to these formal
grounds. It should not be forgotten that although these guidelines represent
a useful tool (in determining conflicts of interest), they do not have the
force of law. Consequently, the particular circumstances of a case and the
relevant case law will remain the determining factor in deciding a question
of conflicts of interest.104

5. Conclusions from the Survey of Case Law
The above case law suggests that while courts may look to the Guidelines as
persuasive authority in evaluating conflicts in international arbitration, courts look
to applicable law first, and the weight given to the Guidelines may vary.

b. Guidelines from the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators maintains a Code of Professional and
Ethical Conduct (“CPEC”) which its members are required to follow.105 As the
Chartered Institute has 15,000 members across 133 countries, many arbitrators may
be bound by the CPEC.106
Part 2 of the CPEC relates “to the conduct of members when acting or seeking
to act as neutrals in alternative dispute resolution processes, wherever conducted,
whether or not they have been appointed so to act by the Institute or any officer of
the Institute and whether or not the process is conducted under the auspices of the
Institute.”107

102. See id. at 3.3.2.2 (internal citations omitted).
103. See id.
104. INT’L BAR ASS’N ARB. GUIDELINES AND RULES SUBCOMM., supra note 31, at 59.
105. CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS, ETHICS, http://www.ciarb.org/guidelines-and-ethics/ethics.
106. CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS, ABOUT CIARB, http://www.ciarb.org/about.
107. CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS, THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL AND ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS, 1 (2009), http://www.ciarb.org/docs/defaultsource/ciarbdocuments/guidance-and-ethics/practice-guidelines-protocols-and-rules/code-of-professional-and-ethical-conduct-october-2009.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
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As explained in the Introduction to the CPEC, the purpose of the CPEC is to
serve as a guide and as a point of reference for users of the process and to promote
public confidence.108 CPEC is described as a reflection of internationally acceptable principles.109 CPEC’s Introduction further notes that in many instances, “members will be bound by other codes of practice or conduct imposed upon them by
virtue of membership of primary professional organisations.”110
This recognition is echoed in the Introduction to Part 2, which provides that the
rules are subject to the overriding requirements that they shall not, among other
things, require a member to act in a way that is unethical or unlawful under any
other Code or law applicable to the member, or override or replace the rules or
applicable laws of any dispute resolution process.111
As for the rules proper, they cover the following nine areas: Behaviour, Integrity and Fairness, Conflicts of Interest, Competence, Information, Communication,
Conduct of the Process, Trust and Confidence, and Fees.112
Thus, members of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, in particular, should
consult these rules and act accordingly.113

C. Institutional Codes and Rules Governing Arbitrator Conduct
As new institutions and jurisdictions vie for prominence as centers of international arbitration, those institutions and jurisdictions are increasingly promulgating
their own ethical rules to govern the resolution of disputes governed by those institutions.114 Ethical rules from several institutions are discussed below.
Examples of institutional codes as they pertain to arbitrators include those
promulgated by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, and the Cairo Regional Centre for International
Commercial Arbitration.
The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre’s Code of Ethical Conduct for
Arbitrators (the “HKIAC Code”) begins with the following preamble:
In some instances the ethics set down in HKIAC’s Code of Ethical Conduct herein may be repeated in legislation governing the arbitration, case
law or the rules which parties have adopted. In many instances, arbitrators
will also be bound by other codes of practice or conduct imposed upon
them by virtue of membership of primary professional organisations…115

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 2.
112. See Id. at 2-3.
113. Indeed, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and its members can, and have, brought disciplinary
procedures against members in the past.
114. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 83 (tracing the promulgation of ethical codes at national and regional
institutions).
115. HONG KONG INT’L ARB. CTR., CODE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT (2017), http://www.hkiac.org/arbitration/arbitrators/code-of-ethical-conduct.
A prior iteration of the HKIAC Rules contained the following language:
The purpose of adopting a Code of Ethics for arbitrators is not only to serve as a guide to the conduct of
arbitrators, but also to serve as a point of reference for users of the arbitration process and to promote
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Thus, akin to the Rule of Ethics discussed above, the HKIAC Code seeks to
promote international norms rather than to provide a rigid set of rules. Two notable,
unique, provisions are set forth below.
First, “[a]n arbitrator shall not permit outside pressure, fear of criticism or any
form of self-interest to affect his decisions.”116 The fear of criticism is an interesting
inclusion but appears to speak to the notion that an arbitrator must be both impartial
and independent. Second, the rules prohibit the acceptance of “any gift or substantial hospitality, directly or indirectly, from any party to the arbitration, except in the
presence of the other parties and/or with their consent.”117 This is in contrast, for
example, with §5.5 of the IBA Rules of Ethics which prohibits the acceptance of
any gift.118
The Singapore International Arbitration Centre’s Code of Ethics for an Arbitrator (“SIAC Code”),119 outlined in part below, also sets forth requirements for
arbitrators.
Prospective arbitrators shall accept an appointment only if they (1) are fully
satisfied that they can discharge their duties without bias, (2) have adequate
knowledge of the language governing the arbitration, and (3) are “able to give to
the arbitration the time and attention which the parties are reasonably entitled to
expect.”120 Second, the disclosure requirements, in addition to asking for any relationships (including personal relationships) of the arbitrators, also requires disclosure of “the extent of any prior knowledge [a potential arbitrator] may have of the
dispute.”121 Third, as a limitation on interviewing prospective arbitrators, prior to
accepting an appointment, “an arbitrator may only enquire as to the general nature
of the dispute, the names of the parties, and the expected time period required for
the arbitration.”122 Fourth, an additional limitation on communications, absent contrary applicable arbitration rules, prohibits arbitrators from conferring with parties
or their counsel until after the Registrar gives notice of the formation of the Tribunal
to the parties.123

D. Conclusion on International Arbitration Ethics for Arbitrators
Given the uncertainty described above, arbitrators are advised to take a cautious
approach to ethical conduct. This approach involves analyzing potentially applicable ethical rules and guidelines, and looking to the arbitration clause, institutional
rules, soft law and guidelines, bar association rules (including those of organizations
such as the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators), and potentially applicable national
law. The best way to avoid potential issues is to err on the side of disclosure and to
set forth, early in a proceeding, applicable ethical codes. A practice pointer, echoed
below in the discussion of best practices for counsel, is for the arbitrators to work
public confidence in arbitration as a suitable forum for resolving disputes. The Code itself is not a rigid
set of rules but is a reflection of internationally acceptable norms.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 15, at § 5.5.
119. SINGAPORE INT’L ARB. CTR., CODE OF ETHICS FOR AN ARBITRATOR, http://www.siac.org.sg/ourrules/code-of-ethics-for-an-arbitrator.
120. Id. at § 1.1.
121. Id. at § 2.2(b).
122. Id. at § 4.1.
123. Id, at § 4.2.
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with the parties to reach agreement on ethical rules following the appointment of
the tribunal.

II. ETHICAL DUTIES OF COUNSEL IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Like arbitrators in international arbitration, counsel may find themselves in an
“ethical no-man’s land.”124 The problem is encapsulated in the following passage:
Counsel in international arbitrations are not regulated by an international
bar; their individual national bar association establishes their code of conduct. A lawyer from a civil law country may have significantly different
obligations concerning preservation of evidence than a lawyer practicing
in a common law jurisdiction. Even among common law jurisdictions, the
difference in preparing witnesses for cross-examination may be significant. Furthermore, counsel in international arbitration may be subject to
diverse and potentially conflicting bodies of domestic rules and norms.
The range of rules and norms applicable to the representation of parties in
international arbitration may include those of the party representative’s
home jurisdiction, the arbitral seat, and the place where hearings physically take place.125
Professor Catherine Rogers has outlined three distinct problems caused by the
lack of clear ethical guidance.126 The first problem, known as “double deontology”
arises where a lawyer is subject to the regulatory power of more than one jurisdiction and the rules of the jurisdictions impose obligations on the lawyer such that it
is impossible to comply with both simultaneously.127 The result is that the attorney
is faced with the prospect of professional discipline regardless of what action is
taken by the attorney.128 The second problem, referred to by Professor Rogers as
the “inequality-of-arms” problem, arises where attorneys who are bound by different ethical rules are involved in a single international proceeding.129 Under such
circumstances, the proceedings may be structurally unfair such as where, for example, a civil law jurisdiction lawyer cannot interview a witness before trial while an
American lawyer is permitted to do so.130
The third problem identified by Professor Rogers, related to the others, is a
“choice-of-law or conflicts-of-law” problem.131 In this iteration of the challenge,

124. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 18 (“…those participating in international arbitration dwell in an
ethical no man’s land”); Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of Advocacy in International Arbitration, Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 18-2010, 1 (2010) (“At best, therefore, attorneys in an international arbitration are each abiding by different and often-conflicting national ethical rules. At worst, they are operating in an ethical no-man’s land”), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559012.
125. Monique Sasson, Ethics in International Arbitration, LAW360 (2016) (internal references omitted).
126. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 107-10.
127. See id. at 107.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 107-08.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 108-11.
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the issue is that it is unclear when and how particular ethics rules apply in international arbitration.132 Professor Rogers illustrated the issue as follows:
Which ethical rules govern a New York lawyer’s confidentiality obligations to his or her French client in a Singapore-seated arbitration against a
Japanese company that is represented by the German office of an English
law firm?133
These issues are exacerbated by what has come to be known as “guerrilla tactics,” actions to delay, obstruct, or subvert the arbitration process.134 Examples of
such tactics include abuse of document production, creating conflicts, frivolous
challenges of arbitrators, frivolous anti-suit injunctions, and witness tampering.135
While the problems are clear, the solutions are less so.136 Some have advocated
for the creation of a universal code of ethics for counsel in international arbitration137 while others see such “hard law” as antithetical to the notion of procedural
flexibility that is a core tenet of international arbitration.138 As set forth below, there
have been attempts to provide a solution, including the promulgation of the IBA
guidelines.

a. IBA International Code of Ethics for Lawyers
First adopted in 1956, and most recently revised in 1988, the IBA’s International Code of Ethics was developed to complement the local ethics standards that
practitioners are required to follow in their home jurisdictions.139 The International
Code of Ethics requires that:
A lawyer who undertakes work in a jurisdiction where he is not a full member of the local profession adhere to the standards of professional ethics in

132. See id. at 108.
133. See id. at 108-09.
134. See Edna Sussman, Can Counsel Ethics Beat Guerrilla Tactics?: Background and Impact of the
New IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration, 6 N. Y. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
LAWYER 47, 48 (2013); see also Edna Sussman & Solomon Ebere, All’s Fair in Love and War – Or Is
It? Reflections on Ethical Standards for Counsel in International Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
611 (2011) (survey of behaviors considered to be “guerrilla tactics”).
135. Sussman & Ebere, supra note 134, at 613-16.
136. Professor Rogers’ answer to the illustration of the “choice-of-law or conflicts-of-law problem” is
humorously telling – “Most attorneys faced with this question could offer only a confused shrug. Most
national bar authorities could not do much better.” See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 109.
137. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS (1971); Detlev F. Vagts, The International Legal Professional: A Need for More Governance?, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 250 (1996); Jan Paulsson, Standards of Conduct for Counsel in International Arbitration, 3 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 214 (1992); Bishop, supra note 1.
138. See Sussman, supra note 134, at 47 (noting that, “A number of commentators believed that there
can be no workable solution to this problem, that there were too many guidelines already confusing the
field of international arbitration, and that regulation would diminish the flexibility of the process”); see
also Landau and Weeramantry, supra note 5.
139. INT’L BAR ASS’N, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF ETHICS, (1988), http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#.
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the jurisdiction where he has been admitted. He shall also observe all ethical standards that apply to lawyers of the country where he is working.140
The International Code of Ethics, though not specific, sets forth general principles regarding ethics. It includes, among other things, the fact that lawyers should
be independent in the discharge of their duties, maintain due respect toward courts,
avoid ex parte communications, and never represent conflicting interests in litigation.141
It does not, however, make any reference to international arbitration. Furthermore, akin to the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers discussed below, it suggests that an attorney must abide by both the ethical codes of their home jurisdiction
and those in which they find themselves practicing. This can be impossible where,
as discussed above, the pertinent rules in the two jurisdictions conflict.

b. IBA International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession
According to the IBA, the 2011 IBA International Principles on Conduct for
the Legal Profession (the “International Principles”) represent “the 21st century version” of the International Code of Ethics, with the International Code of Ethics (and
its revisions) serving as the precursors to the International Principles.142
The International Principles address the following ten core values: (1) Independence; (2) Honesty, integrity and fairness; (3) Conflicts of interest; (4) Confidentiality/professional secrecy; (5) Clients’ interest; (6) Lawyers’ undertaking;
(7) Clients’ freedom; (8) Property of clients and third parties; (9) Competence; and
(10) Fees.
The commentary to the International Principles notes that, “[t]he International
Principles express the common ground which underlies all the national and international rules which govern the conduct of lawyers, principally in relation to their
clients. The General Principles do not cover in detail other areas of lawyer conduct,
for instance regarding the courts, other lawyers or the lawyer’s own bar.”143 It is
notable that the International Principles define “Court/Tribunal” as including an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding.144 This clarifies that the International
Principles do, in fact, extend to arbitration.

c. IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration
On May 25, 2013, the IBA adopted the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation
in International Arbitration (the “PR Guidelines”).145 According to the preamble,
the PR Guidelines “are inspired by the principle that party representatives should
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. IBA publishes new code of conduct for the global legal profession, INT’L BAR ASS’N (JULY 21,
2011),
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=BC99FD2C-D253-4BFE-A3B9C13F196D9E60.
143. INT’L BAR ASS’N, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 10, ¶ 3
(2011), https://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#. C
144. Id. at 33-4.
145. INT’L BAR ASS’N , GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRESENTATION IN INTERNATIONAL ARB. (2013),
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#.
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act with integrity and honesty and should not engage in activities designed to produce unnecessary delay or expense, including tactics aimed at obstructing the arbitration proceedings.”146 The PR Guidelines apply where the parties agree or where
the Tribunal, after determining that it has the authority to rule on such matters, determines that it wishes to use them.147
The PR Guidelines offer guidance on a number of topics including: Party Representatives, such as the exclusion of Party Representatives from participating in all
or part of the arbitral proceedings in the event of a conflict; Communications with
Arbitrators, such as ex parte communications; Submissions to the Arbitral Tribunal,
such as the false submission of fact or expert evidence; Information Exchange and
Disclosure, such as the preservation, collection, request, and production of documents; Witnesses and Experts, such as the preparation of Witness Statements and
Expert Reports; and Remedies for Misconduct, such as admonishing, the drawing
of inferences, and the assessment of costs.
According to a recent IBA report, per a survey on its usage, the PR Guidelines
were only referenced in less than 20% of arbitrations involving issues of counsel
conduct.148 Per the survey, in arbitrations in which the PR Guidelines are referenced, tribunals usually only consult them and do not feel bound by them.149 No
public cases involving reference to the PR Guidelines were reported.150
Although many have welcomed their arrival, the PR Guidelines have been criticized as raising “questions about the generality of ethical codes and about unintended consequences in the form of opportunistic challenges to derail arbitral proceedings or to serve as strategy tools to vacate awards.”151 It has also been suggested that this regulatory scheme, akin to the creation of an international arbitral
procedural code, would result in “replacing an evil (domestic procedure) by a
greater evil (international procedure).”152
At a very minimum, the PR Guidelines provide what Edna Sussman has described as an “excellent opening” for a tribunal to initiate a discussion with counsel
as to “what should be deemed to be appropriate conduct in the arbitration to equalize
ethical norms, curb guerilla tactics and ensure fundamental fairness.”153 Indeed, as
suggested by Dr. Monique Sasson, the best and most practical approach to utilize
the PR Guidelines is to encourage the parties and their counsel to adopt them in
individual cases and to incorporate them in the initial procedural order.154

146. Id. at 2.
147. Id. at 4, ¶ 1; see also Sussman, supra note 134, at 49.
148. INT’L BAR ASS’N ARB. GUIDELINES AND RULES SUBCOMM., supra note 31, at 78, ¶ 203.
149. Id. at ¶ 204.
150. Id. at ¶ 206.
151. William W. Park, A Fair Fight: Professional Guidelines in International Arbitration, 30 ARB.
INT’L. 409, 411 (2014). According to the Queen Mary/White & Case 2015 Survey, only 24% of respondents have seen the PR Guidelines used in practice. See QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON,
SCHOOL OF ARBITRATION & WHITE & CASE LLP, supra note 53, at 35. A further 61% of respondents
were aware of the PR Guidelines but have not seen them used in practice. Id.
152. Park, supra note 151, at 411, n. 10; see also Landau & Weeramantry, supra note 5.
153. Sussman, supra note 134, at 49.
154. Sasson, supra note 125.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2018/iss1/10

18

Halprin and Wah: Ethics in International Arbitration

No. 1]

Ethics in International Arbitration

105

d. Code of Conduct for European Lawyers
The Code of Conduct for European Lawyers (the “Code”) was originally
adopted at the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe Plenary Session held
on October 28, 1988 and has subsequently been amended at Plenary Sessions in
1998, 2002, and 2006.155
The Code was developed in light of the continued integration of the European
Union and the increasing frequency of the cross-border activities of lawyers. The
Code was established with intent to create rules common to European lawyers but
with the recognition that a lawyer will remain bound to observe the rules of the Bar
or Law Society to which he or she belongs (to the extent that they are consistent
with the rules in the Code). The best articulation of this balance is Article 5.9,
which governs disputes amongst lawyers in different member states. Where such a
dispute occurs, under Article 5.9, a lawyer who believes that a colleague has
breached a rule of professional conduct is directed to (1) ”draw the matter to the
attention of that colleague,” (2) ”try to settle it in a friendly way”, and (3) not commence any form of proceeding against a colleague “without first informing the Bars
or Law Societies to which they both belong for the purpose of allowing both Bars
or Law Societies concerned an opportunity to assist in reaching a settlement.” The
rules outline general principles of ethics in the context of client relations, relations
with the courts (with an extension to arbitrators), and relations between lawyers.
As to relations with Arbitrators or Arbitral Tribunals, an attorney is required to
follow the same rules that apply when appearing before a court.156 This requires:
(1) Following the rules of conduct applied before that court or tribunal.
(2) Maintaining due regard for the fair conduct of the proceedings.
(3) Maintaining due respect and courtesy toward the court while defending client interests and doing so without regard to the lawyer’s own interests or to any consequences to him or herself or to any other person.
(4) Never knowingly giving false or misleading information to the
court.157
The explanatory notes are particularly useful with regard to Article 4.2, which
provides examples of improper conduct.158 For example, a lawyer may not make
contact with the judge without informing the lawyer acting for the opposing
party.159
Article 4, however, has been criticized insofar as it fails to answer the following
question: what are the applicable rules of conduct for lawyers appearing before an

155. THE COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUR., CHARTER OF CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE
EUROPEAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS, 13 (2013),
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/EN_CCBE_CoCpdf1_1382973057.pdf.
156. Id. at 19, art. 4.5.
157. Id. at arts. 4.1-4.4.
158. See id. at 30.
159. Id.
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international arbitration tribunal?160 In the absence of a clear answer it may be difficult to comply as required under the Code. This is especially true where the rules
of multiple jurisdictions are involved in an international arbitration and are in conflict.
This issue has not escaped the attention of the drafters. In fact, in the section
describing the purpose of the Code, the drafters stated that “a particular purpose of
the statement of [these] rules is to mitigate the difficulties which result from the
application of ‘double deontology,’ notably as set out in Articles 4 and 7.2 of Directive 77/249/EEC and Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 95/5/EC.”161
Despite this awareness, however, the Code may mitigate the problem of double
deontology, but is unlikely to solve for it in matters involving international arbitration.

e. The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions’ Efforts
to Regulate Counsel Conduct
Similar to the institutional efforts regarding arbitrators, discussed above, some
institutions have also attempted to set forth ethical guidance for counsel.162 Some
commentators have described such efforts as “‘the best of many bad options,’ as
[institutions] can affirm the power of arbitral tribunals to deal with counsel conduct
while addressing the transnational nature of international arbitration.”163
Although not truly a comprehensive code of conduct for counsel, the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators has introduced practice guidelines for the interview of prospective arbitrators.164 The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators’ practice guidelines
were prepared in recognition of the fact that there are wide differences in practice
across jurisdictions and cultures.165 In fact, in preparing the guidelines, it was noted
that there were statements of strong opposition to the idea of interviews being allowed at all.166 One of the key aims of the guidelines, however, is to provide arbitrators wanting a framework in which to operate with a degree of comfort and structure.167
The American Arbitration Association/International Centre for Dispute Resolution maintains “Standards of Conduct for Parties and Representatives.”168 These
160. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 43.
161. Despite this awareness, however, the Code may mitigate the problem of double deontology, but
the Code does not solve for it.
162. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 84.
163. See Charles B. Rosenberg and M. Imad Khan, Who Should Regulate Counsel Conduct in International Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 18, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/04/18/who-should-regulate-counsel-conduct-in-international-arbitration/.
164. CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE GUIDELINE:
INTERVIEWS FOR PROSPECTIVE ARBITRATORS (2015), http://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-source/ciarbdocuments/guidance-and-ethics/practice-guidelines-protocols-and-rules/international-arbitrationguidelines-2015/guideline-on-interviews-for-prospective-arbitrators.pdf.
165. See id. at para. 1.3. In the review of literature in the guidelines, there is express reference to the
ABA’s Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes and the IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators. See id. at para. 2.2. As to the former, as discussed above, there are key provisions
relating to arbitrator interviews.
166. See id. at para. 1.3.
167. See id. at para. 3.1.
168. AM. ARB. ASS’N & INT’L CTR. FOR DISP. RESOL., STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR PARTIES AND
REPRESENTATIVES,
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_ICDR_Standards_of_Conduct_Parties_and_Representatives_0.pdf.
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general standards, among other things, require party representatives to advise their
clients and witnesses as to the appropriate conduct that is expected of them during
the proceedings.169 These general standards largely contain rules which should be
followed in all proceedings, including those in court, such as having the participants
refrain from using vulgar, profane, or otherwise inappropriate language.170
The 2014 Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration
contain a provision that governs parties’ legal representatives through an Annex
with “General Guidelines for the Parties’ Legal Representatives.”171 By adopting
the LCIA Rules, parties are obligated to ensure that their legal representatives comply with the Guidelines.172 As explained by William Park:
This rule-based approach gives the application of professional guidelines
a greater “buy-in” from the parties, and thus broader legitimacy. Unlike
recourse to the inherent powers of a tribunal (ad hoc rulings), or guidelines
elaborated by a professional association, the rules-based approach proves
consistent with the contractual underpinnings of arbitration, where the two
sides in essence define the equality of arms expected through adoption of
an institutional code.173
According to the Annex, the guidelines are intended to “promote generally the
good and equal conduct of the parties’ legal representatives appearing by name
within the proceedings.”174 They are not intended to “derogate from the Arbitration
Agreement or to undermine any legal representative’s primary duty of loyalty to the
party represented in the arbitration or the obligation to present that party’s case effectively to the Arbitral Tribunal.”175 The guidelines are also not to “derogate from
any mandatory laws, rules of law, professional rules or codes of conduct if and to
the extent that any are shown to apply to a legal representative appearing in the
arbitration.”176
The Annex sets forth a number of ethical guidelines including a prohibition on
the making of false statements, the use of false evidence, or the concealment of
documents.177 Critically, the Tribunal is empowered to decide how a representative
has violated the general guidelines and, if so, how to exercise its discretion to impose any or all of the following sanctions: (a) a written reprimand; (ii) a written
caution as to future conduct in the arbitration; and (iii) any other measure necessary
to fulfill within the arbitration the general duties required of the Arbitral Tribunal
under the applicable rules.178
Whether the adoption of ethical codes in institutional rules represents a trend
or the LCIA’s code is simply an outlier, this is an interesting development that
should be monitored by counsel as it provides a potential solution to some of the
problems associated with conflicting ethical rules.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 1.
Id.
THE LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARB., ARB. RULES, arts. 18.5 and 18.6 (2014).
Id. at art. 18.5; See also Park, supra note 151 at 419.
Park, supra note 151, 419-20.
ANNEX TO THE LCIA RULES, ¶ 1 THE LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARB. (2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶3–5.
Id. at ¶7; ARB. RULES, supra note 171, at art. 18.6.
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f. Conclusion on International Arbitration Ethics for Counsel
Given the uncertainty described above, counsel is advised to take a cautious
approach to ethical conduct. This approach involves looking to the arbitration
clause, analyzing potentially applicable ethical rules and guidelines, institutional
rules, soft law and guidelines, bar association rules (including those of organizations
such as the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators), and potentially applicable national
and state law. The best way to avoid potential issues, as echoed above, is for counsel to take a proactive approach by proposing and reaching an agreement on ethical
rules as early as possible in the arbitration.

III. CONCLUSION
Arbitration practitioners, regardless of where they are practicing, should seek
out and be aware of potential ethical rules that may be applicable to a dispute. They
should be aware that although guidelines such as those promulgated by the IBA are
generally voluntary and not universally recognized, the failure to heed them could
have consequences for their clients and the outcome of their cases. This is particularly important for those practitioners who serve as arbitrators, as many arbitral institutions have rules which affect eligibility for appointment and may bind arbitrators to ethics rules even when they do not bind practitioners.
In disputes involving parties from multiple jurisdictions, ethical issues can be
particularly thorny to navigate, as the rules of the various jurisdictions may be in
conflict or otherwise inconsistent. Practitioners encountering such situations would
be wise to come to some agreement, either in drafting the arbitral clause or once the
dispute has begun, regarding the applicable rules or guidelines relevant to the dispute.
Although there is a lively debate brewing as to the need for a binding international code of ethics, there does not seem to be a consensus as to the path forward
for such a code. Recent trends suggest a movement in favor of international principles or guidelines that arbitrators and counsel can look to in a dispute without
making compliance with such principles or guidelines mandatory. While the emergence of such guidelines or rules is to be monitored, the best way to avoid uncertainty, as aforementioned, is to reach an agreement between the parties or to specify
the applicable code of ethics, or the agreed upon principles or guidelines, in the
arbitral clause or in the initial procedural order once a dispute has commenced.
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